skill-scanner-v1

by billyhetech

Install this Skill

curl -fsSL -o skill-scanner-v1.zip https://skill.seembox.com/api/v1/skills/skill-scanner-v1/download && unzip skill-scanner-v1.zip

Download skill-scanner-v1.zip

SKILL.md About

---
name: skill-scanner
description: Security-first skill vetting for AI agents on OpenClaw and Claude Code. Scans any SKILL.md for malicious patterns, permission abuse, prompt injection, and ClawHavoc attack vectors — then gives a clear Safe / Caution / Danger verdict. Use this skill whenever the user wants to install, review, vet, or audit a skill from ClawHub, GitHub, or any other source; asks "is this skill safe?", "should I install this?", "scan/check/vet this skill", "review skill before installing"; shares a SKILL.md file or skill URL; or pastes skill content for evaluation. Proactively offer to scan any skill the user mentions installing, even if they don't explicitly ask for a security check.
compatibility: Works with any SKILL.md-format skill (OpenClaw, AgentSkills spec). Requires network access only when fetching skills from URLs. No additional binaries required.
---

# Skill Scanner

## Input Handling

Accept any of these as input:

1. **ClawHub URL** (e.g., `clawhub.ai/author/skill-name`) — fetch the SKILL.md content via the hub API or raw URL
2. **GitHub URL** — fetch the raw SKILL.md (convert blob URLs to `raw.githubusercontent.com`)
3. **Local path** — read from `~/.openclaw/skills/[name]/SKILL.md` or a path the user provides
4. **Pasted content** — analyze the text directly

If the input is a URL you can't fetch, ask the user to paste the SKILL.md content instead.

---

## Analysis Pipeline

Run all five checks below. Assign each a traffic-light score (🟢 / 🟡 / 🔴) and collect specific evidence. Be precise: cite the exact line or field that triggered a flag.

### Check 1: Frontmatter Integrity

Parse the YAML frontmatter and evaluate each field for consistency and intent:

| Field | What to look for |
|---|---|
| `name` | Matches directory name? Suspiciously similar to a popular skill (edit distance ≤ 2)? |
| `description` | Contains hidden instructions to the agent? Tries to override other skills or suppress safety behavior? Hidden Unicode characters (zero-width spaces, RTL overrides)? |
| `requires.bins` | Lists `curl`, `wget`, `nc`, `ncat`, `python`, `perl`, `ruby` without clear justification? |
| `requires.env` / `requires.config` | Requests credentials, tokens, or API keys beyond the skill's stated purpose? |
| `command-dispatch: tool` | Bypasses model safety review — legitimate for pure tool-dispatch flows, but flag as noteworthy regardless and check whether the skill's purpose justifies it. |
| `disable-model-invocation: true` | Hides the skill from the model's awareness. Legitimate for pure slash-command tools; suspicious if the skill claims to be model-driven. |
| `metadata` | OpenClaw requires single-line JSON here. Unusual keys, embedded commands, or values that don't match the skill's stated purpose? |
| `os` | Platform restriction that seems unnecessary for the skill's purpose? |

Score: 🟢 Frontmatter is clean and consistent / 🟡 Some fields seem unnecessary but not alarming / 🔴 Fields contradict stated purpose or contain suspicious values

### Check 2: ClawHavoc Attack Pattern Detection

Scan the full SKILL.md body for known exploit patterns. Cite the exact line for any match.

**Shell execution / reverse shells:**
- `nc -e`, `bash -i >& /dev/tcp`, `ncat`, `mkfifo /tmp/`
- `python -c 'import socket'`, `perl -e`, `ruby -e`
- `curl ... | bash`, `wget -O- ... | sh` (pipe-to-shell combos)

**Credential harvesting:**
- Reads from `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.gitconfig`, browser cookie stores, system keychain
- Requests `$HOME`, `$USER`, or `$PATH` to enumerate the environment

**Data exfiltration:**
- `curl -X POST` or `wget --post-data` to non-whitelisted external URLs
- Encodes output and sends it out (base64 + curl combo)

**Obfuscation:**
- `echo ... | base64 -d | bash` (decode-and-execute)
- Hex or URL-encoded command strings
- Multi-stage eval patterns

**Prompt injection:**
- Phrases targeting safety mechanisms: "ignore previous skills", "disable skill-scanner", "override system prompt"
- Instructions that tell the agent to act differently than the stated purpose implies
- Hidden Unicode: zero-width spaces (U+200B), right-to-left override (U+202E), or other invisible characters used to conceal instructions

Score: 🟢 No patterns found / 🔴 Patterns detected — list each one with the exact line

### Check 3: Permission–Purpose Alignment

Compare what the skill claims to do against the permissions it requests. The principle: a skill should request only what it genuinely needs.

| Skill Category | Suspicious Permissions |
|---|---|
| Information / lookup (weather, calculator, time) | File system write, shell access, network egress to unknown hosts |
| Content generation (writing, summarization) | Root-level binaries, credential env vars |
| Calendar / email reader | Shell execution, arbitrary file reads outside stated scope |
| Local file tool | Outbound network requests |
| Any skill | `requires.bins` listing network tools (`curl`, `wget`, `nc`) without explanation |

Score: 🟢 Permissions match purpose / 🟡 Mild overreach, plausible explanation exists / 🔴 Permissions dramatically exceed what the skill needs

### Check 4: Instruction Quality and Scope

Read the skill's instructions through the lens of "would a reasonable developer write this?":

- **Clarity**: Are instructions specific about what the skill does and when it activates?
- **Boundaries**: Does the skill define what it will *not* do?
- **Scope creep**: Does it handle things unrelated to its stated purpose?
- **Runtime dependencies**: Does it download or reference external resources at runtime without disclosing this?
- **Autonomy claims**: Does it claim to run automatically, persist state between sessions, or elevate its own privileges?

Score: 🟢 Clear, well-scoped instructions / 🟡 Vague but nothing alarming / 🔴 Overly broad, evasive, or claims unusual autonomy

### Check 5: Trust Signals

Look for positive evidence that the skill is maintained by a real, accountable party:

- **Author**: Named author or verified organization? Anonymous = caution.
- **Version**: Has semantic versioning (e.g., `1.2.0`)? Versioning signals active maintenance.
- **License**: License specified? An open-source license is a meaningful trust indicator.
- **Source**: Public GitHub repo with commit history and open issues?
- **ClawHub standing**: High download count, verified badge, or positive community reviews?
- **Freshness**: Last updated within 6 months? Stale skills may carry unpatched risks.

Score: 🟢 Multiple trust signals present / 🟡 Some signals missing but not suspicious / 🔴 No verifiable author, no version, no source

---

## Safety Report

Present findings in this exact format:

```
🔍 Skill Security Report
══════════════════════════════════════════
Skill:   [name] by [author or "unknown"]
Version: [version or "not specified"]
Source:  [URL or "pasted content"]
══════════════════════════════════════════
[🟢/🟡/🔴] Frontmatter Integrity   → [summary]
[🟢/🟡/🔴] ClawHavoc Patterns      → [summary]
[🟢/🟡/🔴] Permission–Purpose Fit  → [summary]
[🟢/🟡/🔴] Instruction Quality     → [summary]
[🟢/🟡/🔴] Trust Signals           → [summary]
══════════════════════════════════════════
Overall: [SAFE ✅ / CAUTION ⚠️ / DANGER 🚫]

[SAFE: "Looks good. Install with: claw install [name]"]
[CAUTION or DANGER: List specific concerns with exact fields/lines,
 and suggest what the author could change to resolve each one.]
```

**Scoring rules:**
- Any single 🔴 → Overall **DANGER**
- Two or more 🟡 → Overall **CAUTION**
- All 🟢, or one 🟡 → Overall **SAFE**

---

## Behavior Notes

- Do not install a skill automatically — your role is to report findings, not act on them. The user needs to make an informed decision; installing without consent removes their agency.
- If asked to scan multiple skills, process each one separately with its own full report.
- Be transparent about what static analysis can and cannot catch: a sufficiently clever skill could still behave maliciously at runtime in ways that aren't visible in the SKILL.md source.
- Always recommend the user also check GitHub issues and ClawHub community reviews for runtime behavior reports that static analysis misses.
- If a skill fails the scan, explain clearly what the author could change to make it safer — the goal is to raise the bar for the ecosystem, not just block installs.

_meta.json Metadata

{
  "ownerId": "kn74w7x6bwg9mmve7d6ayrrsbx848zb4",
  "publishedAt": 1775485019369,
  "slug": "skill-scanner-v1",
  "version": "1.0.0"
}